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Absract
In this paper, we contribute to a growing literature in the philosophy of social sci-
ence cautioning social scientists against context-independent claims to objectivity, by
analyzing the recent proposal of a new Basic Index of Gender Inequality (BIGI) by
Gijsbert Stoet and David Geary. Despite the many internal problems with BIGI, Stoet
and Geary have had some success in positioning the index as an important corrective
to the way in which gender inequality is measured in mainstream metrics like the
Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI). We argue that this success is facilitated at least
in part by the failure of GGGI’s proponents to adequately justify the methodological
choices underpinning the index in relation to the context in which the index’s findings
are intended to be used. In so doing, the authors of GGGI oversell the objectivity of
the metric’s assessment of the state of global gender inequality—and it is this over-
selling that allows Stoet and Geary to present BIGI as a metric that corrects what they
claim are systematic biases within GGGI. The case of BIGI and GGGI, we argue, sug-
gests that the kind of epistemic modesty exhibited by recent operational approaches to
objectivity is particularly important for social research on highly politically contested
topics.
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Addressing the systematic inequalities faced by women around the world has become
an important aim for policymakers and NGOs in the last few decades. Yet, according
to a recent paper by Stoet and Geary (2019), this aim obscures a number of systematic
issues that affect men. These issues are so significant, they claim, that existing gender
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than men on average, are getting the picture fundamentally wrong. Stoet and Geary
offer a newgender inequalitymetric: theBasic Index ofGender Inequality (henceforth,
BIGI), according which men in fact fare worse than women in more countries than the
reverse. This surprising finding has not gone unnoticed. Stoet and Geary’s results have
been reported in a range of news outlets and their paper was viewed and downloaded
more than 60,000 times in the 2 weeks following its publication.1
As we will show in this paper, BIGI fails to provide compelling evidence to warrant
its controversial conclusions. Despite this, we submit, it would be a mistake to simply
dismiss BIGI as a poor piece of social science unworthy of serious attention. This is
because the traction it has gained in the short time since its publication is indicative
of an important problem in the way that mainstream gender inequality metrics tend
to be framed. Proponents of metrics like the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global
Gender Gap Index (GGGI)—presented by Stoet and Geary as foil for BIGI—do not
adequately justify their methodological choices in relation to the context for which
the index’s findings are intended to reliably contribute. Instead, GGGI is presented
as offering an objective ground for examining gender inequality, irrespective of the
context in which the metrics findings are to be used. Claims to objectivity of this
sort are not uncommon in social research. But, there is a growing literature in the
philosophy of science that cautions against such claims, and makes the case that
evaluations of objectivity in scientific research must made relative to the context in
which this research is intended to be useful.2 Our intention in this paper is to contribute
to this literature by using the case of BIGI and GGGI to articulate another reason to
worry about context-independent claims to objectivity. The lack of epistemic modesty
and adequate contextualism in GGGI, we submit, plays a crucial role in opening
up space for people like Stoet and Geary to present their research as offering a mere
corrective to the partial perspectives offered bymainstreammetrics, rather than having
to acknowledge that their research is grounded in a substantive, and highly contestable,
perspective on the phenomenon of gender inequality. This has the effect of shielding
Stoet and Geary from the need to acknowledge or justify this perspective—shielding
them, in effect, from pragmatic contestation.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 1 we outline how Stoet and Geary position
BIGI against existing gender inequality metrics, typified by GGGI. Then, in Sect. 2,
we argue that BIGI does not succeed in correcting the kinds of biases that that Stoet and
Geary claim to diagnose in GGGI. In Sect. 3, we argue that Stoet and Geary’s claim
that BIGI is superior to GGGI and other mainstreammetrics can be seen as a claim that
BIGI is more objective, where the increased degree of objectivity applies irrespective
of the context in which the metric is to be used. In Sect. 4, we argue that Stoet and
Geary’s arguments for BIGI gain traction, despite flaws in BIGI, because GGGI is
presented as drawing authority from a similarly context independent understanding of
objectivity.
1 Stoet and Geary’s paper was given airtime on BBC Radio and in newspapers around the world, includ-
ing in: the Daily Mail (Pinkstone 2019 [UK]), Metro (Hamill 2019 [UK]), Toronto Star (Hunter 2019
[Canada]), Russia Today (‘Men face MORE’ 2019 [International]), and NRC Handelsblad (Huygen 2019
[Netherlands]). See PLoS ONE website for updated download figures: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0205349.
2 See, for examples, Koskinen (2018) and Wright (2018) and Sect. 4 for more.
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1 Building the basic index of gender inequality (BIGI)
In 1995, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) launched their first devel-
opment indices that utilised gender-differentiated development data. In part because
they grew out of and were reported yearly alongside of the well-known Human
Development Index (HDI) and Human Development Reports, the UNDP’s Gender-
relatedDevelopment Index (GDI) andGender EmpowermentMeasure (GEM) quickly
became key metrics in policy analysis (Hawken and Munck 2013, p. 802). As is often
the case with aggregating indices, disagreements about what should be included in
GDI and GEM have led to the creation of alternatives. Two of the most widely-used
indices that developed after GDI and GEM were the WEF’s GGGI and the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Social Institutions and
Gender Index (SIGI).
Although GDI, GEM, GGGI, and SIGI all differ in their stated goals, the data
they draw upon, the specific issues they highlight, and their methodologies, all four
indices are regularly used to highlight the different ways that women can be seen as
disadvantaged in comparison to men. Stoet and Geary take this common usage as
evidence that GDI, GEM, GGGI, and SIGI are designed to answer the question ‘are
men or women doing better?’ They then argue that the answers GDI, GEM, SIGI, and
GGGI give to this question are biased because they fail to adequately consider the
aspects of life for which men can be seen to fall behind women. Stoet and Geary offer
BIGI as an alternative index that seeks to answer the same question in what they see as
a less biased way. They argue that once their less biased perspective has been adopted
the commonly held belief that men in general fair better than women is thrown into
doubt. Instead of finding that women fare worse than men in most countries of the
world, BIGI finds the reverse. It finds that although women in general do worse in less
developed countries, it is men that fall behind in more developed ones. Overall it finds
that men are disadvantaged in 91 out of 131 countries surveyed (68 percent), with the
median country having a 1.7 percent disadvantage against men.
What are we to make of these striking findings? To evaluate BIGI and understand
how it can reach the conclusions it does we need to drill down a little deeper into the
details.
Given that Stoet and Geary present GGGI as foil for BIGI, the easiest way to
understand how BIGI reaches its controversial conclusions is by understanding how
and why is departs from GGGI. GGGI, which mostly utilises the HDI data and indi-
cators that GDI and GEM are also based on, is divided into four subindices: economic
participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political
empowerment. Each of the four subindices contain a collection of relevant indicators.3
Each indicator is given as a ratio of the female value over the male value, but with
3 Economic participation is comprised of ratios of: female over male labour force participation; wages for
comparable work of women over men; estimated female over male earned income; the number of female
legislators, senior officials, and managers over the number of males in such roles; and, the number of
female professional and technical workers over the number of males in such roles. Educational attainment is
comprised of ratios of: female over male literacy rate; female over male primary-level education enrolment;
female over male secondary-level education enrolment; and, female over male tertiary-level education
enrolment. Health and survival is comprised of ratios of: female over male healthy life expectancy; and, sex
ratio at birth (female over male). Political empowerment is comprised of ratios of: the number of women
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the maximum possible value truncated at 1.4 This means that all indicators appear as
scores between 0 and 1, with the distance from 1 being the gender ‘gap’. The authors
of GGGI claim this one-sided scale is “more appropriate” (Hausmann et al. 2006,
p. 7) than a two-sided, non-truncated scale. Although they do not say explicitly what
they mean by this, we assume it has something to do with loose pragmatic reasoning
they give elsewhere, where they point to the goal of measuring whether countries are
making progress towards closing the existing gender gap “rather than whether women
are ‘winning’ the battle of the sexes” (p. 5). After indicator scores are calculated and
normalised, a score for each subindex is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the indi-
cators within it, with weights for each indicator inversely proportional to their standard
deviation.5 The final GGGI number is then the arithmetic mean of the four subindex
scores, each weighted equally (0.25). See Fig. 1 for a summary of all the subindices,
indicators, weights, and sources of GGGI.
Stoet and Geary’s main criticism of GGGI (as well as GDI, GEM, and SIGI) is that
the subindices and indicators that it includes bias the answers it gives to the question
‘are men or women doing better?’ They make two general and two more specific
points about what we might call inclusion bias. Their first general criticism is that the
subindices and indicators included in GGGI focus on knownways that women seem to
fall behind men (e.g., political representation) but have no way of picking up the many
ways that men fall behind women (incarceration rates, drug and alcohol abuse, etc.).
Their second general criticism about what is included in GGGI is that the subindices
on economic participation and opportunity and political empowerment (as well as
similar subindices in GDI, GEM, and SIGI) do not reflect “true gender inequality”
(Stoet and Geary 2019, p. 3) but rather individual or cultural choices. They argue that
it is plausible that women choose not to enter politics, for example, for cultural or
personal reasons and not because of any lack of opportunity.
Stoet and Geary use these criticisms to argue that any indicators included in gender
related indices must be at a sufficiently general level to pick out disadvantages for
both women and men and to not be skewed by cultural and subjective preferences.
They argue that the only way of doing this is to construct a metric based on a picture
of all-things-considered well-being for both genders. This is what they take to be the
key to the construct ‘gender equality’. Equality between genders is equivalent to men
Footnote 3 continued
over men in parliament; the number of women over men at ministerial level; and, the number of years with
a female head of state (in the last fifty years) over the number of years with a male head of state.
4 The exceptions are life expectancy and gender ratio at birth, which are truncated at 0.944 and 1.06
respectively. These numbers are taken to represent equality for these factors (rather than 1). This is based on
what is considered a ‘normal’ sex ratio at birth (0.944) (Klasen and Wink 2003) and the UN HDI’s targets
for life expectancy (87.5 for women and 82.5 for men, a ratio of 1.06). Since the rationale for truncation is
the same for all indicators, we will simply refer to ‘truncation at 1’ for the remainder of the paper.
5 This means that the indicators with larger standard deviations are weighted less than those with smaller
standard deviations within each subindex. The rationale for this weighting is that it prevents indicators with
large deviations from dominating the variation between countries on each subindex. Note, however, that
all the weights have been kept stable since the first report in 2006, meaning that the standard deviations
in 2006 have defined the weights ever since. For example, within the political empowerment subindex the
ratio of women to men in parliament had a standard deviation of 0.166 in 2006, the ratio of women to men
at ministerial level had a standard deviation of 0.208, and ratio of years of female heads of state to male
had a standard deviation of 0.116. The weight for number of women in parliament is therefore calculated
as (0.01/0.166)/((0.01/0.166) + (0.01/0.208) + (0.01/0.116))  0.310.
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Female labour force participation over 
male [weight in subindex score: 0.199]
International Labour Organization, 
ILOSTAT database, 2017 or latest available 
data
Number of female legislators, senior 
officials, and managers over male 
[0.149]
Number of female professional and 
technical workers over male [0.121]
Wage for comparable work of women 
over men [0.210]
WEF Executive Opinion Survey (EOS), 
2017-2018 
Estimated female earned income over 
male [0.221]
WEF calculations based on the UNDP
methodology (refer to Human 




Female literacy rate over male [0.191]
United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization Institute for 
Statistics, Education indicators, database, 
2017 or latest available data
Female primary-level education 
enrolment over male [0.459]
Female secondary enrolment over male 
[0.230]




Female healthy life expectancy over 
male [0.307]
United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects, 2017 or latest 
available data 
Sex ratio at birth (female over male) 
[0.693]
World Health Organization, Global Health 





Number of women in parliament over 
men [0.310]
Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in 
National Parliaments, reflecting 
elections/appointments up to October 2018
Number of women at ministerial level 
over men [0.247]
Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in 
Politics: 2017, reflecting appointments up 
to January 2017 
Number of years of female head of state 
in the last fifty years over number of 
years of male head of state [0.443]
WEF calculations, reflecting situation as of 
30 June 2018 
Fig. 1 GGGI subindicies, indicators, weights, and sources. Source: Zahidi et al. (2018, pp. 5–6)
and women doing equally well with respect to some “core aspects of life,” which
Stoet and Geary define as the “opportunity to live a long and healthy satisfied life
that is grounded on educational opportunities in childhood” (2019, p. 3). They break
this into three independently necessary components—healthy long life, educational
opportunities in childhood, and life satisfaction—and calculate a subindex for each.6
6 Note that this is an odd notion of welfare, one that does not seem to be based on any serious philosophical
analysis of what should count as welfare. We criticise it in more detail in Sect. 2.
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Within GGGI’s health and education subindices, Stoet and Geary make two more
specific accusations of inclusion bias. First, GGGI’s health subindex is made up of life
expectancy and the ratio at which boys and girls are born, both weighted inversely to
their standard deviations. Stoet and Geary take issue with this. They argue that the fact
that healthy life expectancy is weighted less (at 0.307) than sex ratio at birth (0.693) in
GGGI’s health and survival subindex “undervalues the health and survival of actually
living persons” (2019 p. 3). Moreover, they argue that although gender ratio at birth
may indicate negative attitudes towards women,7 it is an indirect way of measuring
such attitudes. Stoet and Geary, therefore, jettison the gender ratio at birth indicator
entirely from their metric, leaving the health subindex of BIGI as simply a ratio of
healthy life expectancy for men and women.
Second, GGGI’s education subindex is comprised of ratios of male and female
primary, secondary, and tertiary education enrolment and a ratio of male and female
literacy rates. Stoet and Geary argue that, like the economic and political indicators
that GGGI includes, tertiary education enrolment rates “may result more from choice
that from a disadvantage” (2019, p. 2). Given this they decide to also remove tertiary
education enrolment from their education subindex.
Overall BIGI scores are then the arithmeticmean of subindices for healthy long life,
educational opportunities in childhood, and life satisfaction (each weighted 0.333).
The first two of these subindices use the indicators that remain fromGGGI’s health and
education subindices once sex ratio at birth and tertiary enrolment ratios are excluded.
BIGI’s ‘healthy long life’ subindex is a simple ratio of the life expectancy figures
that GGGI and GDI also use. To circumvent any worries about weighting choice, the
‘educational opportunity in childhood’ subindex is taken as the greatest from parity
(rather than a weighted average) of the three remaining education ratios: primary
enrolment, secondary enrolment, and literacy rates. The additional subindex on ‘life
satisfaction’ is a simple ratio of the average male and female answers to GallupWorld
Poll’s question ‘life today’.8
In addition to arguing that GGGI is biased in what it includes, Stoet and Geary
argue that GGGI exhibits what we might call calculation bias. Stoet and Geary take
particular issue with GGGI’s method of truncating indicator scores at 1. They argue
that this automatically obscures any male disadvantage:
GGGI truncates all values such that no country can, by definition, be more
favorable for women than for men (for details see below). As a result, existing
measures do not fully capture patterns ofwellbeing anddisadvantage at a national
level. This is an important oversight, as there are issues that disproportionately
7 GGGI’s authors justify the inclusion of sex ratio at birth as capturing such attitudes. In their own words:
“This variable aims specifically to capture the phenomenon of ‘missing women’ prevalent inmany countries
with strong son preference.” (Hausmann et al. 2006, p. 6).
8 “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder
represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for
you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?” (See Helliwell
et al. 2018, note 16).
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affect boys and men. … [T]here is no defensible rationale for truncating scores
on an ‘equality’ measure when they disadvantage boys or men (2019, p. 2).9
In order to include the possibility that men might be disadvantaged, BIGI uses a two-
sided scale between -1 and 1 for each indicator. All indicators (ratios of life expectancy,
life satisfaction, primary enrolment, secondary enrolment, and literacy) are given as
the distance from 1 of the smallest number over the largest number (e.g., 1—male
life expectancy/female life expectancy). A negative sign is then added if the smaller
number corresponds to themale figure and a positive sign added if the smallest number
corresponds to the female figure.10 In addition to adopting a two-sided scale, Stoet
and Geary also choose to shift from yearly data to taking five-year averages—the idea
being that this makes BIGI less susceptible any yearly quirks.
Altogether, then, BIGI exhibits eight key differences to GGGI (1–7 are summarised
in Fig. 2):
1. The removal of the economic participation and opportunity subindex and related
indicators.
2. The removal of the political empowerment subindex and related indicators.
3. The removal of tertiary enrolment ratio within the education subindex.
4. The removal of sex ratio at birth within the health index.
5. The addition of a life satisfaction subindex.
6. The education subindex score is a maximum rather than an average (this means
that all subindices are a single number and none contain internal weightings).
7. The shift from yearly reporting to taking five-year averages.
8. Each indicator (and consequently subindex) is calculated as a two-sided posi-
tive/negative score rather than a single sided scale truncated at 1.
9 This seems to misunderstand GGGI’s aim of measuring gender gaps rather than women’s’ empowerment.
Although, as we will argue in Sect. 4, whether this is oversight or deliberate misreading on the part of Stoet
and Geary, it may be partly explained by an insufficient focus in GGGI reports on the particular pragmatic
context forwhich the specificmethodological choices of the index are deemed to provide “themost objective
basis” for discussing the different factors related to gender inequality (Zahidi et al. 2018, p. 4).
10 The sign is added later and the smaller number is always divided by the larger number because 1 −
x/y y/x − 1.
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Female labour force participation over 
male
Number of female legislators, senior 
officials, and managers over male
Number of female professional and 
technical workers over male
Wage for comparable work of women 
over men





as indicator that 
differs most from 
parity; weight in 
BIGI score: 0.333]
Ratio of female and male literacy rates
United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization Institute for 
Statistics, Education indicators, database, 
average 2012-16
Ratio of female and male primary-
level education enrolment rates
Ratio of female and male secondary
enrolment rates
Female tertiary enrolment over male
Healthy life 
expectancy [0.333]
Ratio of female healthy life 
expectancy to male
United Nations Population Division, 
World Population Prospects, average 
2012-16
Sex ratio at birth (female over male)
Political 
empowerment
Number of women in parliament over 
men
Number of women at ministerial level 
over men
Number of years of female head of 
state in the last fifty years over 
number of years of male head of state
Overall life 
satisfaction [0.333]
Ratio of female and male life 
satisfaction
Gallup World Poll, answers to ‘life 
today’ question, average 2012-16
Fig. 2 BIGI subindicies, indicators, weights, and sources, in contrast to GGGI. Omissions from GGGI are
greyed out, changes and additions are underlined. Sources: Stoet and Geary (2019) and Zahidi et al. (2018)
2 Problems with BIGI
BIGI is presented by Stoet and Geary as a necessary corrective to the inclusion and
calculation biases of GGGI. The extent of the supposed skewing of common under-
standings of gender inequality caused by these biases is brought into sharp relief by one
of BIGI’s most counterintuitive results. BIGI finds that, contrary to what many people
believe, women are actually less disadvantaged than men in Saudi Arabia and that
Saudi Arabia is in fact the third most equal country for women and men in the world
(after only Italy and Israel). The unexpectedness of this finding warrants scrutiny.
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2.1 Inclusion bias
The fact that BIGI finds women and men to be almost equal in Saudi Arabia invites
skepticismaboutwhat Stoet andGeary include in their conceptualization of gender par-
ity. Recall that for Stoet and Geary, parity is the balancing out of all-things-considered
well-being, where all things considered well-being is taken to be a combination of
life satisfaction, educational opportunities in childhood, and life expectancy. Saudi
Arabia performs well in terms of overall parity because although men and women
have substantially different scores for these three components—women have a much
lower rate of basic education attainment, whereas men have a lower life expectancy
and lower life satisfaction scores—when these disparities are aggregated they more
or less cancel each other out, leaving Saudi Arabia with a small overall advantage for
women.
The reason Stoet and Geary give for focussing on life satisfaction, educational
opportunities and life expectancy at the expense of political and economic factors is
that they capture the “core aspects of life” while also, they claim, not being affected
by different cultural influences or individual choices (2019, p. 3). But it is far from
clear that the picture of all-things-considered well-being generated by measuring life
satisfaction, education, and life expectancy is not impacted by cultural or individual
choice.
Consider BIGI’s educational opportunitymeasure for Lesotho. According to BIGI.,
Lesotho has “one of the largest gender gaps in education in favor of girls” (Stoet and
Geary 2019, p. 13).11 But, as Stoet and Geary themselves note, greater educational
enrolment of girls in Lesotho is in part due to the greater role men and boys play
in the labour market. This may be of benefit to girls on certain understandings of
well-being, but a comparative lack of ability to be involved in the labour market also
creates an economic dependence on men later in life that may also cut against their
well-being.12 Stoet and Geary might respond that female scores for life satisfaction
in Lesotho would reflect this dynamic—i.e., if the disadvantage of exclusion from the
labour market outweighs the benefit of their comparatively high rates of education,
then female life satisfaction scores would reflect this13—but they offer no evidence
as to why this would be the case. Such a response, moreover, would undermine Stoet
and Geary’s claim that measuring all things considered well-being requires measuring
more than life satisfaction alone. If life satisfaction scores pick up on the relevant
11 This is a score of − 0.36738. Neither Stoet and Geary’s paper nor the companion website (Stoet 2019)
provide the full data, just the overall education score, so we do not know whether this is data from primary
educational enrolment, secondary enrolment, or literacy (although the fact that Stoet and Geary go on to
talk about this score in terms of enrolment means that it is likely not the literacy rate).
12 Ansell (2002, pp. 96–97) notes, for example, that curricula in rural schools in Lesotho are very often
segregated according gender, with vocational subjects geared towards employment, such as woodwork and
metalwork, being taught only to boys; furthermore, calls for a greater focus on vocational education for
girls tend to be couched in terms of better preparing them for being mothers, wives and homemakers rather
than contributors to the waged-labour economy.
13 Indeed, they seem to make precisely this kind of move when they argue that “while it is very difficult to
determine the degree to which men and women are disadvantaged in any particular aspect of life, an overall
assessment of life satisfaction likely reflects the combination of advantages and disadvantages they have
experienced, whatever they might be” (2019, p. 3, emphasis added).
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well-being consequences of differential educational opportunities, then it is not clear
why we need to include educational opportunities in our measure of well-being at all.
Little is said as to why educational opportunities in childhood are crucial beyond that
leaving out any one of the three components:
[M]isses an important aspect of what defines a good life. For example, a person
may have a satisfied and long life, but without educational opportunities, such a
person might not have had a chance to develop his or her talents (2019, p. 3).
If Stoet and Geary accept a conception of well-being that recognises the importance
of capacities and/or opportunities as well as life satisfaction then it is not clear why
economic empowerment or freedom should not also be considered as key ingredients
of a good or fulfilled life. Stoet and Geary argue that the specific indicators used by
GGGI to factor in economic and political empowerment are susceptible to “personal
motives or… cultural, political or religious strictures” (2019, p. 4). Yet, as the example
of Lesotho shows, so are the educational opportunity indicators in BIGI. Moreover,
Stoet and Geary make no effort to come up with alternative political and economic
indicators. If educational opportunities are to be considered part of well-being and
political and economic opportunities not, then an argument for that conception of well-
being needs to be given. If it is simply an issue with biased indicators for political and
economic opportunities, then educational opportunities are not immune and there is no
reason not to come up with alternative political and economic opportunity indicators.
There is, or course, a vast literature on the subject of what constitutes human well-
being and how that well-being should be measured. This is a literature that Stoet and
Geary completely ignore in their (scant) explanation for why they choose to focus on
the three factors that they do.14 A cynical observer might conclude that this move is
simply aimed at drawing attention to well know men’s rights issues.
Even if we ignore this lack of sufficient justification for including educational and
not political or economic factors in an all-things-considered picture of well-being,
there are worries to be had about the heavy use of life satisfaction survey results in
BIGI. The extensive literature on adaptive preferences that has flourished in recent
decades has drawn critical attention to the ways in which systematic deprivation or
disadvantage can substantially impact a person’s sense of life satisfaction—with gen-
dered disadvantages being one of the key examples of this phenomenon.15 Stoet and
Geary make no mention of the challenge this literature presents to the idea that well-
being can be effectively measured via life satisfaction. Indeed, they go as far as to
suggest that overall life satisfaction scores, in particular, can serve as a kind of proxy
measure for the cumulative disadvantages and advantages men and women experi-
ence, making it a unique selling point for BIGI that it includes these scores where
other metrics do not.
14 For a convenient summary of various theories of well-being and the disparate measures adopted for each
theory, see Alexandrova (2017, p. xxxv).
15 Sen’s pivotal example—of the extent to which Bengali widows, in the aftermath of the famine of 1943,
had much lower rates of self-reported ill-health than did widowers, despite the fact that widows in general
were considerably more deprived (Sen 1984, p. 309)—is instructive here. See also chapter 5 of Nussbaum
(1999), and Khader (2011).
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Our point here is not to deny that there may be contexts in which measuring
childhood education opportunities, life expectancy rates, or overall life satisfaction
scores—or even, potentially, some combination of the three—might be useful for
understanding certain aspects of gender inequality. Rather, what we want to empha-
sise is that BIGI is no less vulnerable to the accusation of inclusion bias in general than
GGGI. Like GGGI, BIGI relies on a set of assumptions that may be justifiable in some
context but that can be seen as problematic biases in others. Stoet and Geary, recall,
accuse GGGI of producing a skewed picture of gender inequality, through the inclu-
sion of indicators which focus exclusively on known women’s issues, and others that
are likely to be impacted by individual choice or cultural norms and beliefs. Given
well-documented worries about the impact of systematic disadvantages on subjec-
tive welfare assessments like life satisfaction, and the demonstrable role that cultural
factors can play in a country’s childhood educational opportunities score (just to high-
light two examples), there are more than adequate grounds for accusing BIGI of being
equally biased as to what it includes and excludes.
2.2 Calculation bias
The second set of methodological choices that are called into question by BIGI’s
Saudi Arabia score contain its trade-off style, double-sided scale and the weights it
uses. Stoet and Geary summarise their observations on Saudi Arabia by saying that:
“becausemen’s andwomen’s disadvantages average one another out, it [Saudi Arabia]
reaches a high level of overall parity” (p. 8). And the BIGI website states:
We believe that the Global Gender Gap Report [GGGI] is biased by ignoring
societal problems that affect more men than women, which results in an unreal-
istically negative outlook for women. The reality is that bothmen andwomen are
affected by societal issues, and that issues men and women face differently can
cancel one another out (Stoet 2019, ‘Common questions about BIGI’; emphasis
added).
Of course, the claim that some issues that disproportionately affect men (prison pop-
ulations or drug abuse, for example) do not get due discussion in policy circles is
perfectly reasonable. But the idea that societal issues which affect different groups of
the population cancel one another out seems a decidedly odd way to think about how
one might want to improve people’s lives—be they men or women. A metric in which
societal issues are tallied up and cancelled out essentially hides those issues.
The logic at play here seems to be based on a misunderstanding about feminist
arguments for equality. Feminists typically do not argue that all men do better than all
women out of present social relations.16 They instead argue that in general men have
more power, agency, and money in present social relations and that these factors cause
patriarchal norms and ways of thinking to dominate society. The fact that patriarchal
norms and patterns of thought might hurt both men and women, and might even some-
times hurt men more than women, does not count against such an argument—indeed,
16 Especially not as the rise of intersectional analysis has focussed attention on the interplay between
gender and other axes of identity.
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it is a corollary of the feminist critique of the gender binary that restrictive norms are
enforced on men, as well as women. This makes it likely that there will be certain
harms or disadvantages which disproportionately accrue to men and boys.17 In oppos-
ing patriarchy, feminists oppose the social system characterised by men in general
having more power, agency, and money than women—which includes opposition to
the harms that this patriarchal system inflicts on men. By equating gender equality
with a situation in which the various harms differently affecting men and women can-
cel each other out—a situation, in other words, where men and women are harmed
equally—BIGI totally distorts the feminist analysis of patriarchy which underpins the
interest in measuring gender inequality. Especially interesting on this point is the fact
that Stoet and Geary do acknowledge that “the lack of gender inequality [represented
by BIGI scores closest to 0] does not imply that women or men have abundant oppor-
tunities in life […] and neither does it mean that a country is free of sexist attitudes”
(Stoet and Geary 2019, p. 15). To address this fact, they also rank countries in BIGI
not, in fact, by their BIGI scores, but by their Average Absolute Deviation from Parity
(AADP) scores. They even say of the AADP ranking that it “better reflects the amount
of work to be done (in a society) to resolve all relevant gender disparities” (ibid).
Given this acknowledgement of the limitations of the trade-off style BIGI scores, it is
significant that the authors nonetheless present the BIGI scores themselves, and not
the AADP scores, as the flagship innovation of their new index.18
Stoet and Geary also argue that because each subindex in BIGI is given as a single
number and is not a weighted average of different indicators, they are able to avoid the
potential weightings biases that they see as skewing the GGGI calculations. But their
tripartite system—education, satisfaction, life expectancy—is itself the product of an
unacknowledgedweighting decision, aboutwhich there should be serious reservations.
Given that women have a longer life expectancy in nearly all countries of the world and
that female mammals live longer in general, there is reason to believe that exact life
expectancy parity in any society may indicate disadvantages for women rather than
equality. Including healthy life span as one third of the BIGI’s overall score makes it
much more difficult to pick up on the possibility that women face a disadvantaged but
longer life in some countries. If life span is excluded from BIGI or weighted less than
one third then many of BIGI’s headline findings (e.g., on Saudi Arabia, or that women
do better in most developed countries) are reversed or become less pronounced.
As with the issue of inclusion bias, our point here is not that nothing useful could
ever come from employing BIGI’s trade-off style double-sided scale, or weighting life
expectancy heavily, in measuring gender inequality. There may be uses and contexts
that could justify such methodological choices. Our point is that BIGI is no more
immune to accusations of calculation bias in general than GGGI. Stoet and Geary
present their method as a response to what they see as the skewed calculations of
GGGI, positioning BIGI as an unbiased measure of gender equality by contrast (Stoet
2019, ‘Background’). Yet there are clearly grounds to think that BIGI makes a number
17 Even mainstream media reporting on the kinds of men’s issues that Stoet and Geary highlight acknowl-
edges the role of gender norms in facilitating harms to men. See for example Schumacher (2019), Coles
(2019) and Ananthaswamy and Douglas (2018).
18 Note that, while they avoid the issues involved in giving a trade-off based overall score, the AADP scores
can still be accused of containing all of the other biases BIGI can be accused of.
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of assumptions in relation to its weightings and calculations that may be considered
biased when viewed in certain contexts. The heavy weighting of life expectancy, and
the decision to take exact life expectancy parity as the benchmark for gender equality,
certainlywarrants the suspicion thatBIGI scoreswill exhibit a bias towardsminimising
or obfuscating female disadvantage; as does the decision to trade-off comparativemale
and female disadvantage across the three subindices in the calculation of the overall
BIGI score.
3 Bias, objectivity, and context
BIGI is, thus, at least as vulnerable to the charge of bias as GGGI. Yet, Stoet and
Geary appear to have been quite successful so far in positioning BIGI as an antidote
to the issues they claim to identify with GGGI. What is going on here? How has BIGI
gained critical traction against GGGI and other mainstream approaches to measuring
gender inequality (as evidenced by the extent of the attention andmedia coverage it has
received), despite the fact that it fails to successfully overcome the issues it identifies
with GGGI?
At least part of the answer to this question, we believe, lies in the way that Stoet
and Geary lean on the authority of objectivity in their critique of GGGI.19 More
specifically, it is the way that they associate the measurement of “true gender equality”
(Stoet and Geary 2019, p. 3) with the mitigation or elimination of a specific set of
(feminist) perspectives, with the resulting objectivity of such a measurement judged
independently of context. To see what we mean by this, it is helpful to briefly examine
in greater detail the reasoning and language used by Stoet and Geary in presenting
BIGI as an antidote to the apparent problems of inclusion and calculation bias in
GGGI.
As noted above, the authors argue that GGGI is biased because it is grounded in
a conception of gender inequality that contains cultural and political assumptions.
Given that specific “disadvantages cannot always be defined objectively,” Stoet and
Geary choose to base BIGI on life satisfaction scores, educational opportunity metrics
and life expectancy—all measures that they argue are “culturally independent” (Stoet
and Geary 2019, p. 15; emphasis added in both). At the centre of Stoet and Geary’s
argument, then is the claim that GGGI is biased by judgements and assumptions that
are the product of a set of particular (cultural or political) perspectives, which skew
or distort the picture of gender inequality produced by the metric and compromise
its objectivity—and that BIGI, by contrast, avoids the infiltration of bias through its
culturally independent approach.
The authors argue, for example, that jumping to the conclusion that there must be
something wrong with BIGI on account of its finding that Saudi Arabia has a relatively
high level of gender parity would simply recapitulate the kind of cultural biases in
GGGI. Those of us with a Western perspective will be biased towards a negative
assessment of many of the more heavily gendered facets of life in a country like Saudi
19 Another piece of the puzzle is clearly the political context into which the research has been presented –
we will return to this at the end of the paper.
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Arabia—one that might not be shared by citizens within the country. To decide that
the BIGI metric is a flawed or inappropriate measure of gender inequality because
its conclusion vis-à-vis life in Saudi Arabia does not accord with our own, culturally
influenced assessment of it, is to compromise what, as far as possible, should be a
process—measuring gender inequality—independent of cultural, political, or other
perspectives. A lack of such perspectival independence in the construction of a metric
makes for a compromised picture of reality.
Similar reasoning and language (‘skew’, ‘bias’, ‘overestimation’) is present
throughout Stoet and Geary’s paper.20 And, the framing of BIGI in opposition to
GGGI is presented even more forcefully on the website accompanying BIGI, where
BIGI’s closer approximation to a “true measure of gender inequality” is explicitly
positioned against GGGI’s biased and therefore untrue measure:
[GGGI] relies heavily on issues that are often highlighted in women’s rights
movements. […] While the GGGI can be useful as a measure of women’s
advancement in the areas of politics and employment, it is too biased to one
specific gender to consider it a true measure of gender equality […] the BIGI
aims to provide a simplified and unbiased measure by focusing on key indicators
that are relevant to all men andwomen in any society (Stoet 2019, ‘Background’;
their italics, our bold).
What is evident in these passages is that Stoet and Geary’s twofold argument, against
GGGI and in favour of BIGI by comparison, relies on the idea that truth in social
scientific research is compromised by the presence of considerations that stem from
certain social, political, or otherwise pragmatic, perspectives. GGGI, on their view,
does not give an accurate picture of the phenomenon of gender inequality because
the various decisions about what to include in the index and how to calculate country
scores are informed by a cultural or political agenda (as the see it) and this biases the
picture of gender inequality generated by the metric. BIGI, by contrast, is comparably
independent of such considerations, which makes the picture it generates less biased
and hence more accurate.
This equation of the presence of any perspective with bias and less truth appears
to draw on a way of thinking about the nature of objectivity that is common in scien-
tific research, in which objectivity is associated with the idea of a ‘view-point from
nowhere’ (Nagel 1989; Rorty 1979). According to this view, objectivity (whether it is
actually attainable in practice or can only be aimed towards) consists in achieving a
view-point from no perspective in particular and that such a view-point represents the
true state of affairs in theworld. Since perspectives are partial, anything that introduces
a particular perspective into a research process skews that research and compromises its
objectivity. In the case of BIGI and GGGI, Stoet and Geary’s argument is that GGGI’s
findings are biased because the metric is designed, at least in part, from the perspective
20 It is in the justifications for their indicator choices and the two-sided scale, and in their accusation that
GGGI exhibits calculation bias. For example: “[C]ertain subindices may result more from choice than from
a disadvantage. … [D]ifferences in occupational preferences and strategic divisions of labor in family life
may skew quantifications of true gender inequality.” (pp. 2–3; emphasis added).
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of a particular political (i.e. feminist) agenda. Since BIGI—so the authors claim—is
designed independently of such a perspective, its findings are more objective.21
Central to the objectivity-as-view-from-nowhere ideal that Stoet and Geary are
drawing on is the idea that the evaluation of objectivity is context-independent. That
is to say, how objective we deem something (a research process, a measurement tool,
a picture of the world) to be does not depend on the context for which that thing
is designed. The point of the view-from-nowhere ideal is to strive to shed all and
every partial perspectival on the thing in question, with the aim of achieving the most
objective view of it. How objective the end product of this process is thus has nothing
to do with the context in which we want to make use of the thing (research process,
measurement tool, etc.) in question; all that matters is that we get as close as possible
to the total elimination of partial perspective, since all such perspectives, regardless
of context, undermine objectivity.
The view-from-nowhere ideal of objectivity has been heavily criticised by philoso-
phers of science.22 It is beyond the scopeof this paper to give anoverviewor assessment
of all of these various critiques; it suffices for our purposes only to note that contem-
porary philosophy of science has in general moved away from the more ontological
concerns about access to the “really real” (Lloyd 1995) that underpin the view-from-
nowhere ideal. Instead, increased attention has been paid to developing what Heather
Douglas (2004) calls “operational” notions of objectivity—ways of articulating what
objectivity might require that are more closely tied to the methods and processes of
regular scientific research.23 Among these discussions three factors are particularly
relevant for our purposes. First, there are scenarios in which including more perspec-
tives (of the right sort24) might be said to offer more objectivity (Harding 2015; Wylie
2003). Second, that the elimination of any and all perspectives is too often implau-
sible (Douglas 2009; Longino 1990, 2001), if not impossible (Nagel 1989), so that
in practice trade-offs are likely to be made about which perspectives compromise (or
aid) objectivity. Third, in part because of these two points, what is deemed to threaten
or boost the objectivity of something, as well as what is deemed to be the most appro-
priate strategies for mitigating those threats or attaining those benefits, will typically
be determined by specific features of the context in which that thing is intended to
21 For the most part, we are reading this notion of objectivity from Stoet and Geary’s equation of the
elimination of biasing perspectives with the attainment of truth; but it should be noted that they do use the
term ‘objectivity’ in such a way that implies this view-from-nowhere ideal (they caution that what counts as
a life disadvantage “cannot be defined objectively” (p. 15), and for this reason their use of life satisfaction
scores is preferable because these scores are culturally and politically independent).
22 See, for examples, Megill (1994), Nagel (1989), and Reiss and Sprenger (2014).
23 See Burch and Furman (2019), Koskinen (2020), and Zahle (2020) for examples of philosophers putting
this call for operational versions of objectivity into practice for specific areas of social research.
24 Those trained by experience to impartially (i.e., without any incentives to skew their judgement) spot
key phenomena, like an expert witness in a trail, for example.
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be used.25 Wright illustrates this contextualised way of thinking about evaluations of
objectivity with the following example:
If energy usage projections are to be used to determine future government invest-
ment in energy infrastructure, that goal determines what the projections should
step back from. In the context of that goal, the interests of energy companies
might be relevant to step back from. Accordingly, one way in which the objectiv-
ity of energy usage projections can be judged is how much they step back from
those interests. This stepping back then occurs in the production of the projec-
tions—maybe they can be produced by an independent bodywith no connections
to the energy industry. (2019, p. 398)
In contextualised understandings of objectivity, then, they key idea is that attempts
to increase the objectivity of something should be dictated in part by factors relating
to the context in which that thing—a measurement tool, a research process, a picture
of the world—is intended to be reliably used. What does this entail for Stoet and
Geary’s accusation of bias against GGGI? Recall that the basis of their accusation is
that GGGI’s design is informed by certain perspectives (political and cultural), and the
influence of these perspectives serves to skew the index’s rankings and make them less
objective. They juxtapose this with what they see as the independence of BIGI from
such perspectives. Crucially, however, Stoet andGeary fail to adequately contextualise
their justification for these claims. In order to substantiate the claim that the various
perspectival considerations that they see as informing the construction of GGGI serve
to bias the index, Stoet and Geary would need to show that these considerations
undermine the index’s findings relative to the context in which they are intended to be
useful. Similarly, in order to justify the claim that BIGI is more objective, they would
need to explain why the mitigation of the particular perspectival considerations that
they take themselves to have addressed in comparison to GGGI serves to remove a
particular threat to the objectivity of the index, relative to its intended use and goals.
Absent such a contextual justification, the claim to BIGI’s greater objectivity must
implicitly rely on something like the bigger view-from-nowhere ideal, where context
of intended use plays no role in evaluations of objectivity. This, we submit, is part of
how Stoet and Geary are able to level the charges of calculation and inclusion bias
against GGGI, despite the fact that BIGI is no less vulnerable to these charges once
it is subject to methodological scrutiny. By appealing to the idea of objectivity as
the maximal elimination of any and all perspective, they perform a kind of sleight
25 Different authors interpret the context relevant for judging objectivity differently (see, for example,
Zahle 2020). Although we follow Koskinen (2018) and Wright (2018) in focusing on the contexts in which
things (e.g. metrics) are used, our argument does not rest on this. Philosophers also disagree whether
objectivity should be thought of as incorporating positive epistemic elements (Wylie 2003; Zahle 2020)
or only mitigating negative epistemic elements (Hacking 2015; Koskinen 2020). Our discussion mainly
focusses on objectivity understood in terms of mitigating negative elements, simply because this is the
approach to objectivity implied by Stoet and Geary’s focus on the mitigation of bias in relation to truth and
accuracy. However, we remain agnostic on the broader question as to whether positive or negative accounts
of objectivity are preferable in general.
Also see Daston and Galison (2007), Fine (1998), Kincaid et al. (2007), Kuhn (1977), Montuschi (2004,
2014, 2017), and Padovani et al. (2015), for a series of discussions on objectivity and value-freedom that
foreshadow the contextualised accounts of objectivity we refer to here.
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of hand: drawing attention to the perspectival considerations informing GGGI and
framing them as biasing the index, and presenting their supposed mitigation of these
same considerations in BIGI as a consequent achievement of a greater degree of
objectivity—all whilst ignoring the different perspectives informing their construction
of BIGI.
Stoet and Geary, thus, fail to offer a proper, contextualised assessment of the com-
parative objectivity BIGI and GGGI. Such an assessment would require attending
to the context in which each of the indices is intended to offer reliable information,
and evaluating whether the mitigation or elimination of certain perspectives in the
construction of each index successfully diffuses the most significant threats to the reli-
ability of that index’s findings, relative to that intended context of use.26 It is precisely
this detailed, contextual work that Stoet and Geary fail to do in their reductively simple
presentation of BIGI as providing a more objective, truer picture of the state of global
gender inequality that GGGI.
Stoet and Geary’s chicanery in their articulation of the charge of bias against GGGI,
however, is only one part of the explanation as to why the charge has proved capa-
ble of generating considerable traction. The other part, we argue, concerns GGGI
itself—specifically, the way in which GGGI’s authors themselves fail to adequately
justify their various methodological choices relative to the pragmatic context to which
the index is intended to contribute. This failure, we believe, leaves the door open to
Stoet and Geary’s sleight of hand vis-à-vis their claim to superior objectivity.
4 Leaving the door ajar: inadequate contextualism in GGGI
Each of the yearly WEF Global Gender Gap Reports includes, as part of its method-
ology section, a brief elaboration of three basic concepts which underpin GGGI’s
approach to measuring gender inequality. These concepts are: (1) measuring gender-
based gaps, rather than absolute levels of achievement; (2) measuring gender-based
outcomes rather than inputs; and, (3) measuring proximity to gender equality rather
than the empowerment of women. Each concept is accompanied by some justificatory
remarks.
The focus on measuring gaps rather than absolute levels (1) for each indicator is
justified on the basis that to do otherwise would be to penalise countries which are less
developed generally, but might nonetheless have made great progress in equalising the
quality of life of men and women in many respects. This means that countries with
smaller gaps between men and women (in tertiary education enrolment, for example)
will be ranked higher than those with larger gaps but higher overall achievement (more
women enrolling in tertiary education overall). The decision to measure proximity to
gender equality rather than women’s empowerment (3) is justified on the basis that
the goal of the index is to measure the extent to which countries make, or fail to make,
progress in closing the various gaps between men and women, rather than to assess
which gender might be coming out on top in various respects. This is why GGGI is
26 The intended context of use for GGGI and BIGI may or may not be the same, and this will obviously
impact the ease with which an evaluation of their comparative objectivity could be conducted—we will
return to this question at the end of the paper.
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reported on a scale from 0 to 1 (with 1 being equality or a higher level for women)
rather than on a two-sided scale.
For conceptual components (1) and (3), the justification offered thus amounts to a
clarification of what the index is and is not intended to be useful for—namely, it is
intended, narrowly, to provide comparable information on the extent towhichwomen’s
attainment is lagging behindmen in a number of indicators. Themethodology sections
of the reports do not contain a further explanation as to why tracking women’s perfor-
mance relative to men’s in the chosen indicators is important (and for what purpose);
but some explanation to that effect can be deduced, in the case of the 2018 report, from
remarks made in the Preface. Here, the goal of achieving gender equality is framed
in terms of the need to ensure that men and women can make an “equal contribution
[… to the] process of deep economic and societal transformation” and the need for
societies not to “lose out on the skills, ideas and perspectives of half of humanity to
realize the promise of a more prosperous […] future” (Zahidi et al. 2018, p. v).27
These remarks reveal that the overall perspective from which the index is conceived
and constructed is a developmental one, where the phenomenon of gender inequality
is problematised primarily as a barrier to economic development and prosperity.
It is the developmental goals of the index, and the specific policy context to which
it is contributing, then, that dictates that the index measures gaps in attainment rather
than absolute levels, and proximity to gender parity rather than whether women are
doing better than men. The justification for measuring gender-based outcomes rather
than inputs or means (2), by contrast, is quite different. The focus on outcomes is
justified on the basis that this approach provides a “snapshot of where men and women
stand with regard to some fundamental outcome indicators related to basic rights such
as health, education, economic participation and political empowerment”—and this
snapshot provides “the most objective basis” for discussing other more contextual
factors related to gender inequality (Zahidi et al. 2018, p. 4). It is this that is used to
justify the specific indicators used in the metric—“outcomes” like number of female
heads of state rather than “inputs” like the length of paid maternity leave.
The difference between how (1) and (3) and (2) are justified is subtle but important.
Justifications for methodological choices take the form of explanations as to why
particular research approaches should be preferred over others (Crasnow2015, p. 638).
In the case of conceptual components (1) and (3), the answer offered to the question of
why GGGI’s approach to measuring gender inequality is preferable makes reference
(albeit in a rather scattered and superficial way) to the policy context in which the
issue of gender inequality is problematised and the index’s findings are intended to be
useful. In the case of component (2), the answer goes further: namely, that the kind of
evidence that is gathered bymeasuring gendered outcomes, using the specific data and
methods of the index, allows us to obtain the most objective, most accurate ‘snapshot’
of the state of global gender inequality, irrespective of how the snapshot should be
used.
The idea that themost objective picture of the phenomenon of gender inequality can
be attained through a focus on measuring outcomes comes from Ricardo Hausmann (a
27 A similar focus can be identified in the 2006 report Preface, which emphasises the need for “tapping
into the extensive reservoir of women’s skills” in order to meet the challenges facing businesses (Hausmann
et al. 2006, p. v).
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contributor to the WEF reports), who proposes that progress can be made in establish-
ing how certain policy outcomes can be achieved—for example, sustainable growth
or gender equality—by adopting a strategy of ‘learning without theory’ (Hausmann
2016). Too much research, Hausmann contends, gets caught up in trying to produce or
verify causal theories about complex social phenomena; theories we are either not in
a position to construct, or whose accuracy we cannot determine. When we construct
metrics on the basis of such theories, which measure purported or hypothetical causes
for the outcomes we seek, we risk instigatingmisguided and unhelpful policy agendas,
by incentivising actors to improve their performance with respect to indicators which
may or may not lead to more successful outcomes. In such cases, in other words, we
“attempt to be more theory-driven than our knowledge allows” (Hausmann 2016).
According to Hausmann, GGGI is an example of a good index which limits itself only
to measuring what it can know for sure: whether and to what extent countries have
improved their performance with respect to the various outcome indicators. On the
basis of this benchmarking, less well-performing countries can improve by imitating
the practices of higher ranked countries.
It is Hausmann’s worries about the potential pitfalls of theory-driven research that
underpin the claim that GGGI’s methodological strategy gives “the most objective
basis” for analysing gender inequality. Gender inequality is a complex and multi-
faceted phenomenon; if we attempt to track countries’ progress towards overcoming
it by measuring anything other than change in the relevant outcome variables, accord-
ing to Hausmann, we risk quantifying things that we don’t truly know—namely, the
salience of various possible causal factors for the outcomes we seek. By only mea-
suring outcomes, the authors of GGGI want to avoid endorsing any causal claims or
assumptions about how gender inequality functions or what might be done about it.
They do so to avoid GGGI being biased by preconceived ideas about what the right
solutions to the problem of gender inequality might be. There are a number of ways we
can make sense of this. We might worry that our theories about what factors causally
contribute to gender inequality are wrong for all kinds of reasons: idiosyncratic cogni-
tive biases or errors of reasoning on the part of individual researchers; the contingent
fact that certain causal theories have received more attention than others, and might
thus seemmore compelling because of this disproportionate focus; or particular social,
cultural, and political outlooks from which researchers might consciously or subcon-
sciously approach a topic. We might also just get things wrong because the task is
a difficult one and there are limits to what we can know about how complex social
phenomena work. The point is that, if we allow judgements or assumptions about
the causes of gender inequality to impact what we measure and how we measure it,
each of these ways in which those judgements and assumptions might be mistaken
could serve to distort or skew the picture of gender inequality that our metric would
generate—meaning that the resulting picture of the state of gender inequality will be
less objective than it would be without these considerations.
Theproblemwith this line of argument,we suggest, is that it obscures thenecessarily
pragmatic and contextual considerations that go into choosing what to include in
an index like GGGI. The development-policy context informs which outcomes are
taken to be salient for capturing the phenomenon of gender inequality. Only against a
set of background theoretical hypotheses, about the particular reasons why gendered
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disparities should be of concern to policy makers and politicians, can the choice of
indicators in GGGI be justified. Without these theoretical foundations, there is no
justification for why subjective well-being, for example, is not taken to be one of the
“fundamental outcome variables” (Hausmann et al. 2006, p. 5) according to which
gender parity should be measured.
Similarly, the developmental context of GGGI must also inform the distinction
between ‘outcome’ and ‘input’ variables. In a different pragmatic context—one in
which gender inequality is problematised principally as matter of injustice, for exam-
ple—access to government-funded childcare in different countries might be identified
as a fundamental outcome variable, on the basis that the provision of universally acces-
sible childcare is a necessary component of achieving justice for women.28 In GGGI,
by contrast, access to government-funded childcare is included in country profiles
only as one of a list of additional indicators whose data might help explain a country’s
gender inequality score (Hausmann et al. 2006 p. 29), since parity is defined from a
development perspective whereby what is desirable to achieve is not primarily justice,
but the “equal contribution of men and women” to a process of “deep economic and
societal transformation” (Zahidi et al. 2018, p. viii). Access to childcare thus does not
factor into the gender equality league table that GGGI generates—and this impacts on
the ‘snapshot’ of reality generated by the index.
Of course, relative to the broader context of a global policy and funding emphasis on
development, into which the findings of GGGI are intended to contribute, it may well
represent a sensible pragmatic decision to adopt a perspective on gender inequality
through which it is problematised fundamentally as a barrier to the equal economic
contribution of men and women. From this perspective, it might make sense to worry
that measuring factors such as access to childcare risks measuring things that we
don’t know for sure are causally connected to expanding women’s participation in
different economic sectors. We do not wish to deny this. The point, though, is that
it is only within this pragmatic context that the strategy of measuring outcomes can
properly be understood to constitute a step towards increased objectivity in the index.
From a different contextual perspective—a concern with a more holistic assessment
of the various harms associated with the differential treatment of men and women,
for example—this strategy might be considered to make the findings of the index
less objective, since it eliminates the possibility of measuring factors which should
be considered essential to understanding the nature and extent of gender inequality.
Evaluated from such a context, GGGI’s rankings might look unacceptably skewed or
biased.
Thus, from a contextualist perspective, the justifications formethodological choices
involved inGGGI’s design leave a lot to be desired. Although, aswe have seen, some of
the index’s methodological features are justified in relation to the pragmatic context to
which its scores and rankings are intended to contribute, this contextualisation is scant.
It also underplays (i) the extent towhich the specific development-policy context is just
oneway of framing the phenomenon of gender inequality as a problem to be tackle; and
28 Universal access to childcare might be thought of as essential for helping to mitigate the inequality
in various life opportunities that women experience as a result of being disproportionately burdened with
reproductive and childcare labour—making rectifying this inequality a matter of achieving a just social
settlement for women.
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(ii) the fact that the developmental policy context directly informs several of the key
methodological commitments of the index, including themerely-measuring-outcomes
approach, which the reports do not acknowledge.
This, then, is the way in which GGGI leaves the door open to Stoet and Geary’s
accusation of bias. Because the GGGI reports contain only minimal reference to the
policy context into which the index is designed to contribute29—and totally fail to
justify the supposedly objectivity-generating methodological choice of merely mea-
suring outcomes in relation to this context—the effect is to oversell the objectivity of
the index’s findings, which paves theway for sceptics of themetric tomake accusations
of bias.
From this perspective, indeed, there is a narrow way in which Stoet and Geary’s
accusations against GGGImight be seen to have some kind of validity. The inadequate
contextual justification of the methodological choices underpinning GGGI creates
space for Stoet and Geary to point out—rightly—the ways in which the picture of
gender inequality generated by the index is only partial (for example, that there are
many heavily gendered phenomena that the index doesn’t measure). Since GGGI
doesn’t do enough to justify thesemethodological decisions in relation to its contextual
goals, Stoet and Geary can thus claim that GGGI is unacceptably biased and present
BIGI, by contrast, as a less biased alternative.
Of course, as we have already shown, BIGI itself is replete with assumptions that
undercut its claims to be unbiased in general. Insofar as Stoet and Geary also fail
to justify their various methodological choices in terms of them being appropriate
pragmatic choices relative to a certain goal, their claim that BIGI produces a more
truthful picture of gender inequality thanGGGI is no less dubious than those ofGGGI’s
proponents. Furthermore, given the issues outlined in Sect. 2, it is much harder to
envisage what an adequate pragmatic justification would look like in the case of BIGI,
such that, relative to a certain pragmatic use, BIGI’s measurement of gender inequality
could be deemed sufficiently objective. BIGI certainly doesn’t seem like a particularly
useful guide to policy. Given theway that its two-sided scale trades-off different factors
against one-another, obscuring inequality for both genders in the process, it is hard
to see how BIGI could illuminate important factors to change in any given country.
Given the heavyweighting of life expectancywithinBIGI, and the generally longer life
expectancies of women (which may well be due to biological differences), the policies
recommended by aiming for BIGI parity seem likely to ensure overall lower female
educational opportunities and/or life satisfaction. And, given Stoet and Geary’s lack
of justifications for educational indicators being included as BIGI’s only opportunity
measurements, it is hard to see how BIGI might be used in any serious debate as to
how opportunities should be more equally distributed between genders. Thus, BIGI
seems likely to face more of a challenge than GGGI to produce an adequate defence
that its findings are to some significant extent objective relative to a specific use.
Our point, however, is that BIGI is, in a sense, saved from having to do this sub-
stantive work by the fact that GGGI largely fails to do it. Since the methodological
decisions underpinningGGGI are insufficiently contextualised, and its claims to objec-
29 The water is further muddied by fact that, beyond what little contextual information is provided in the
prefaces, elsewhere the reports occasionally slip into selling the index as a means for contributing towards
the more widely ranging goals of ‘justice’ and ‘social equality’.
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tivity insufficiently qualified, Stoet and Geary are able to position BIGI as offering
a corrective to the seeming biases of GGGI—a corrective which, once administered,
succeeds in attaining something closer to the kind of view-from-nowhere picture of
gender inequality that GGGI, as they frame it, seeks but fails to generate. The authors
can thus piggyback on GGGI’s insufficiently contextualised claim to objectivity, gain-
ing leverage for their promotion of BIGI as a favourable alternative by pointing out
GGGI’s apparent failings. If, on the other hand, more was done to emphasise that the
indicators chosen in GGGI represent “the most objective” way of measuring gender
inequality relative to the specific context in which its finding are intended to be used,
BIGI would have no access to such easy leverage. This would mean that Stoet and
Geary would have to make a substantive case for why their approach to conceptu-
alising and measuring gender inequality is best for achieving a particular pragmatic
goal—which would entail putting their own perspectival cards much more firmly on
the table and opening up them up to pragmatic and political contestation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have sought to achieve two things. The first was to expose the unwar-
ranted nature of the assessment of the state of global gender inequality offered by
BIGI, which we achieved by a critical examination of Stoet and Geary’s methodologi-
cal choices in constructing the index. We demonstrated that BIGI is no less vulnerable
to the charges of inclusion and calculation bias that Stoet and Geary level at GGGI,
and is thus no better placed to claim that it produces a truer picture of gender inequal-
ity. Our second aim was reveal that Stoet and Geary’s critique of mainstream gender
inequality metrics, and their presentation of BIGI as a favourable alternative, was
facilitated in part by GGGI itself. We argued for this by showing how GGGI’s claims
to provide the most objective picture of gender inequality are insufficiently qualified
with respect to the particular pragmatic, policy context in which the metric’s rankings
are intended to be used. It is this context independent claim to objectivity, we argue,
that Stoet and Geary are able to make use of in positioning BIGI as a corrective to the
perceived bias in GGGI.
As discussed above, there is an emerging group of contemporary philosophers of
social science that caution against the use of context independent notions of objectivity
in social scientific practice, and advocate instead for the adoption of context-sensitive
and partial notions of objectivity. Without wishing to nail our colours firmly to any
one mast within this group—that is, without advocating any one particular contex-
tualist account of objectivity—we broadly agree that social scientists would do well
to embrace a kind of epistemic modesty with respect to their claims to objectivity.
This means, among other things, being clear both about the context in which a given
piece of research is intended to be used, and the steps taken to increase the objectivity
of the research for that context. The purpose of this paper has been to use the recent
case study of BIGI’s publication, and its take-up in popular media and discussion, to
articulate an additional worry which we think should be added to this growing voice
of caution against context-independent claims to objectivity in social research. The
case of BIGI and GGGI is instructive, we believe, because it demonstrates the dangers
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posed when mainstream social science that engages highly politically sensitive topics
claims to offer an objective view of these topics without adequately contextualising
these claims. This positioning obscures the fact that methodological justifications in
social scientific research must typically be context-dependent, and in doing so leaves
this social science open to accusations of bias and creates space for reactionary social
science to position itself as a necessary corrective.
Stoet and Geary clearly have the perspective that attempts to measure global gen-
der inequality are operating in an environment where feminism may have gone too
far in focussing the attention of politicians and policy makers on women’s issues
at the exclusion of those that affect men. This perspective taps into a broader con-
text of backlash and pushback against the progress of feminism and other progressive
movements into the political and policymainstream—a zeitgeist that, clearly, provides
another crucial facet of the opportunity structure that has enabled Stoet and Geary’s
intervention. Our point is that, for those of us who think that this perspective is mis-
guided, it would be a mistake to think that we can avoid this disagreement simply by
reasserting the methodological superiority and objectivity of GGGI (and other more
establishedmetrics). Stoet andGeary correctly highlight some important blind spots in
GGGI that may undermine the objectivity of the picture of gender inequality the met-
ric generates, given certain policy goals. The task of devising an objective metric for
gender inequality is always going to depend, in part, on how the phenomenon itself
is conceived and problematised, and this framing will very likely be susceptible to
political contestation—and we should not avoid this contestation by claiming for our
own preferred tools andmeasures a kind of objectivity that isn’t context sensitive. This
episode suggests that it is especially important for social scientists working on highly
politically contested topics such as gender inequality, immigration, or the impact of
climate change, where the goals of research are subject to intense disagreement, to be
clear on the contexts within which their claims to objectivity should be evaluated.
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